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FIGURE 1. General design considerations for biocontainment units
INTRODUCTION
The SimTigrate Design Lab at the Georgia Institute 
of Technology has engaged in research on the 
design of biocontainment units (BCU) for several 
years, from the perspectives of both healthcare 
worker safety and patient experience. In response 
to increased awareness of the challenges of caring 
for patients with highly infectious diseases in the 
wake of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Georgia Tech, 
together with Emory University and Georgia State 
University, took part in a multidisciplinary research 
program (Prevention Epicenter of Emory and Atlanta 
Consortium Hospitals – PEACH), funded by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
It focused on exploring new strategies to improve 
the safety of both patients and healthcare personnel 
during care delivery. The SimTigrate research team 
focused on ways in which the built environment 
might support or hinder safe doffing of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) within a BCU.
OVERALL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS OF BCU
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) spreads through human-
to-human transmission via direct contact or contact 
with the bodily fluids of an infected person, and 
indirectly through contact with contaminated 
surfaces and materials (e.g., medical equipment) 
(World Health Organization 2018). Removal of PPE 
is recognized as a high-risk activity because the 
healthcare worker (HCW) needs to extract themselves 
from the potentially contaminated PPE without it 
coming into contact with their bare skin. This can 
be an especially difficult task to accomplish after 
providing hours of direct patient care, as healthcare
This white paper presents a summary of the work on the design of biocontainment units (BCU) that 
the SimTigrate Design Lab has been engaged in for the past 4 years. This document outlines design 
strategies for designing a safer and more efficient BCU, and is intended to provide information for 
designers (architects and interior designers), facility managers, and design researchers. These 
design strategies should be considered for implementation in both current and future BCUs.
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workers are likely fatigued, which can contribute to 
errors or risky behaviors and potential acquisition 
of lethal pathogens (Casanova, Alfano-Sobsey et al. 
2008, Tomas, Kundrapu et al. 2015, Casanova, Teal 
et al. 2016).
General design requirements specify that the BCU 
needs to be separated from normal patient care 
areas with secured interlocking double-door access, 
have an independent air-handling system and 
negative air-flow, seamless and cleanable surfaces, 
and a pass-through autoclave (Smith, Anderson et 
al. 2006). In response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, 
the CDC updated their guidance on PPE (including 
procedures for PPE donning and doffing) in which 
they emphasized the importance of  BCU design, 
highlighting the need for a separate, dedicated space 
for doffing in order to reduce the risk of cross- and 
self-contamination of healthcare personnel (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 2014). The CDC 
guidelines suggest that the donning and doffing areas 
need to be separated from the direct patient care 
area (patient’s room), and the layout should allow for 
clear separation between clean and contaminated 
areas. A unidirectional staff and equipment 
throughput that follows a clean-to-dirty path should 
be clearly marked with visible signage (e.g., color 
demarcation on the floor). The doffing area should 
be large enough to enable freedom of movement 
of HCWs during doffing and to accommodate all 
necessary equipment. Additionally, all steps of PPE 
donning and, especially, doffing need to be visibly 
monitored by a Trained Observer (TO) (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2014).
SPECIAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DOFFING 
AREA
Over the course of multiple projects, the SimTigrate 
Design Lab team has learned how the design of the 
biocontainment unit, and in particular the layout of 
the doffing area, can reduce the contamination risk 
of HCWs. We identified 5 key design requirements 
of doffing spaces that support safer HCW behavior 
during the doffing process: 
(1) Facilitate communication between HCW and 
TO; 
(2) Signify steps in the PPE doffing process; 
(3) Provide stabilization for the HCW during PPE 
doffing; 
(4) Nudge/automate the safest choices; and 
(5) Promote situational awareness (DuBose, 
Matić et al. 2018, Zimring, Matić et al. 2018). 
In a redesigned doffing area, with some of these 
strategies implemented, we found that both physical 
and cognitive load of HCWs, as well as the occurrence 
of risky behaviors, significantly decreased (Wong, 
Matić et al. 2019). Our studies have demonstrated 
that optimized design and layouts that are based on 
ergonomic principles and empirical guidelines can 
have a measurable impact on HCW contamination 
risk while doffing their PPE (Wong, Matić et al. 2019).
For more details on methods and design recommendations, please see our recent publications:
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OPTIMIZED LAYOUT OF DOFFING ROOM 
FOR SINGLE- AND DUAL-USE 
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Doffing area detail shown on next page (Figure 3.)
SHOWER
“CLEAN” PATH “DIRTY” PATH RETURN TO CLEAN AREA
FIGURE 2. The overall layout of the biocontainment unit, showing treatment rooms, doffing area, shower, and observation area. The layout allows for 
unidirectional staff and equipment flow that follows a clean-to-dirty path.
CORRIDOR / 
OBSERVATION AREA
We propose the following optimized design for a 
biocontainment unit based on our evaluation and 
testing of many BCU designs. The proposed unit 
consists of two patient rooms, connected by a 
large doffing area in the middle. Each patient room 
has an exterior window, a window to the doffing 
area, and a window to the corridor that, in addition 
to the built-in communication system, allows for 
patient observation, staff communication, and 
communication between family members and the 
isolated patient (Figure 3). 
The unit enables unidirectional flow, with a path 
that allows HCWs to move from clean to dirty areas 
without backtracking. This layout can support either 
one or two patient rooms. Having one doffing area 
that serves two patient rooms is an efficient way to 
use space and can reduce the staffing burden for 
Trained Observers, as one TO can doff both HCWs 
entering from the room on the left and the room on 
the right (with their doffing times staggered, ideally 
in 2 hour intervals, instead of simultaneously). The 
dashed line shows the location of a wall should the 
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4 Chemical mats (5-1; 5-2; 5-3) for 
HCW to step onto while doffing. TO 
automates as much of the doffing 
process as possible by setting up 
space (e.g. establishing chemical 
mats) to reduce the cognitive burden 
of HCW
Designated area for primary-
use trashcan offers flexibility 
to accommodate various reach 
envelopes
Floor is demarcated to signify 
HCW path and direction to shower, 
area for TO observation, and 
placement of equipment (e.g. 
chemical mats)
HCW has quick and easy access 
to balance aids. Primary means 
should be fixed (e.g. wall-mounted 
grab bar 3-1), and secondary 
means should be mobile (e.g. 3-2 
L-shaped stool)
HCW has quick and easy access to 
wall-mounted hand hygiene (wipes 
and hand sanitizer) at all times and 
locations. Wall-mounted hand hygiene 
should be within reach of HCW 
(recommended distance 20.5”)
The designated path follows a 
unidirectional flow for HCW during 
entire doffing process
TO has unobstructed visibility of a 
wall-mounted doffing protocol and 
digital clock for timing duration of 
hand hygiene
HCW has unobstructed visual 
access to a mirror for self-
inspection from the designated 
doffing zone
Shelves and storage options 
should not obstruct the processes 
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